CEO internal experience and voluntary disclosure quality: Evidence from management forecasts

Internally‐promoted CEOs should have a deep understanding of their firm's products, supply chain, operations, business climate, corporate culture, and how to navigate among employees to get the information they need. Thus, we argue that internally‐promoted CEOs are likely to produce higher quality disclosure than outsider CEOs. Using a sample of US firms from the S&P1500 index from 2001 to 2011, we hand‐collect whether a CEO is hired from inside the firm and, if so, the number of years they worked at the firm before becoming CEO. We then examine whether managers with more internal experience issue higher quality disclosures and offer three main findings. First, CEOs with more internal experience are more likely to issue voluntary earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Second, CEOs with more internal experience issue more accurate earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Finally, investors react more strongly to forecasts issued by insider CEOs than to those issued by outsider CEOs. In additional analysis, we find no evidence that these results extend to mandatory reporting quality (i.e., accruals quality, restatements, or internal control weaknesses), perhaps because mandatory disclosure is subjected to heavy oversight by the board of directors, auditors, and regulators. Overall, our findings suggest that when managers have work experience with the firm prior to becoming the CEO, the firm's voluntary disclosure is of higher quality.     

Activist‐impelled divestitures and shareholder value

Research Summary : This study analyzes how the divestitures that are impelled by activist investors in their campaigns against public corporations affect shareholder value. Using hand‐collected data on the activist campaigns that were launched against and the divestitures that were undertaken by Fortune 500 companies between 2007 and 2015, we find that activist‐impelled divestitures are more positively associated with immediate and longer‐term measures of shareholder value than comparable manager‐led divestitures. These performance differences persist for nearly two years after the completion of these deals. Our results empirically test the idea that firms with agency problems unlock shareholder value when they divest, and support the notion that activist investors fulfill an important external governance function. Our work also opens new research opportunities and offers practical implications as well. Managerial Summary : This study investigates how divestitures that are undertaken at the behest of activist investors affect shareholder value. We find that divestitures that were undertaken under pressure from activist investors are associated with more positive shareholder returns than comparable divestitures that were undertaken voluntarily by managers. These performance differences persist for nearly two years after the completion of these deals, alleviating concerns about the purported short‐termism of activist investors. Our findings suggest that activist investors may fulfill an important governance function by inducing managers to undertake strategies that they might not otherwise pursue, thereby unlocking shareholder value.     

Uncertainty,Control, and Karl Polanyi’s Protective Response

Post-Keynesian institutionalist economists like Wallace Peterson and John Kenneth Galbraith recognized that the impact of uncertainty on economic wellbeing depends in part on the degree of control people have over the sources and consequences of it. Given the inability of government and other large institutions to reduce uncertainty or to provide citizens with the ability to manage it, mediating structures are considered as an alternative means of promoting economic security. The article concludes by describing and evaluating several of these alternatives.     

Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection: Implications for Discount Window Stigma

I study the implications for central bank discount window stigma of a workhorse model of adverse selection in financial markets. In the model, firms (banks) need to borrow to finance a productive project. There is limited liability and firms have private information about their ability to repay their debts, which gives rise to the possibility of adverse selection. The central bank can ameliorate the impact of adverse selection by lending to firms. Discount window borrowing is observable and it may be taken as a signal of firms' credit worthiness. Under some conditions, firms borrowing from the discount window may pay higher interest rates to borrow in the market, a phenomenon often associated with the presence of stigma. I discuss these and other outcomes in detail and what they suggest about the relevance of stigma as an empirical phenomenon.     

Pricing Defaultable Bonds Using a Lévy Jump‐Diffusion Model

This paper uses a reduced‐form approach to derive a closed‐form pricing formula for defaultable bonds. The authors specify the default hazard rate as an affine function of multiple variables which follow the Lévy jump‐diffusion processes. Because such specification allows greater flexibility in the generation of a valid probability of default, their pricing model should be more accurate than the valuation models in traditional studies, which ignore the jump effects. This paper also proposes a new method for estimating the parameters in a Lévy Jump‐diffusion process. The real data from the Taiwanese bond market are used to illustrate how their model can be applied in practical situations. The authors compare the pricing results for the influential variables with no jump effects, with jump magnitudes following the normal distribution, and with jump magnitudes following the gamma distribution. The results reveal that the predictive ability is the best for the model with the jump components. The valuation model shown in this paper should help portfolio managers more accurately price defaultable bonds and more effectively hedge their portfolio holdings.     

There and Back Again: The De‐Licensing and Re‐Licensing of Barbers in Alabama

The economic effects of occupational licensing remain an understudied topic, but even less is known about the effects of the removal of licensing legislation. In this article, we take advantage of a natural experiment that occurred in the state of Alabama. Alabama was the last state to begin licensing barbers in 1973 and also the only state to de‐license barbers (in 1983). Relying on data from 1974 to 1994, we find evidence that barber de‐licensing reduced the average annual earnings of barbers as well as the number of cosmetologist employees per million residents in Alabama, although not all our results are statistically significant. We also find evidence that de‐licensing resulted in small increases in the number of barber shops and decreases in the number of cosmetology shops in Alabama. In recent decades, a number of attempts have been made to re‐license the occupation — most recently with a barber licensing bill that became law in September 2013. The result is that barbering in Alabama is once again a licensed occupation. Our limited evidence suggests that the re‐licensing of barbers in Alabama may already have had an effect on pay and on the number of barber shops.     

Costs and potential funding of expanded public pension coverage in Asia

Public pension burdens in most emerging Asian economies are still relatively small. However, there are a number of reasons to believe that they will increase markedly in the coming years. First, many Asian economies will face rapidly ageing populations, which will raise pension and other old‐age‐related spending dramatically. Second, as economies develop, political pressures to expand the coverage of public pensions and raise pension benefits will likely increase. The first objective of this paper is to identify the potential fiscal burden of public pensions in 23 emerging Asian economies, based on econometric models and forecasts of GDP and demographic trends. Using two different methodologies yields estimated increases in the average share of public pension expenditures in GDP of 1.0 percentage point and 3.6 percentage points by 2030 compared with current levels. We believe the latter estimate is more realistic. The second objective is to recommend policies to provide adequate funding for public pension needs, including enhancing the efficiency of social insurance programs, improving the balance of revenues and expenditures, implementing more explicit fiscal rules and frameworks, and establishing stronger fiscal surveillance at the national and regional levels.     

Prediction based on entrepreneurship-prone personality profiles: sometimes worse than the toss of a coin

Small Business Economics - The human personality predicts a wide range of activities and occupational choices—from musical sophistication to entrepreneurial careers. However, which method...     

Sparse Signals in the Cross‐Section of Returns

This paper applies the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) to make rolling one‐minute‐ahead return forecasts using the entire cross‐section of lagged returns as candidate predictors. The LASSO increases both out‐of‐sample fit and forecast‐implied Sharpe ratios. This out‐of‐sample success comes from identifying predictors that are unexpected, short‐lived, and sparse. Although the LASSO uses a statistical rule rather than economic intuition to identify predictors, the predictors it identifies are nevertheless associated with economically meaningful events: the LASSO tends to identify as predictors stocks with news about fundamentals.